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Abstract: Increasing regulatory and doctrinal attention has recently focused on the problem of 
‘platform power’. Yet calls for regulation of online platforms fail to identify the problems such 
regulation would target, and as a result appear to lack merit. In this paper, two claims are 
advanced. First, that the concept of ‘platform power’ is both an under and over-inclusive 
regulatory target and, as such, should be replaced by the broader concept of a ‘digital 
gatekeeper’. Second, that existing legal mechanisms do not adequately reflect the power over 
information flows and individual behaviour that gatekeepers can exercise. In particular, this 
gatekeeper power can have implications for individual rights that competition law and 
economic regulation are not designed to capture. Moreover, the technological design, and 
complexity, of digital gatekeepers renders their operations impervious to scrutiny by individual 
users, thereby exacerbating these potential implications.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When John Perry Barlow penned the ‘Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace’1 it was governments, ‘weary giants of flesh and steel’, rather than 
private actors that threatened to jeopardise emerging governance structures in 
‘cyberspace’.2 Twenty years later, it is acknowledged that, contrary to early cyber-
libertarian thinking, the Internet can be regulated3 and Internet governance is no 
longer the sole purview of the State. The State increasingly operates in tandem 
with online private actors in security and law enforcement4, in the provision of 
public goods5 and even to adjudicate what is in the ‘public interest’.6 Moreover, 
online private actors are supported by States through private law rights and 
liabilities7 and enabled to influence the behaviour of individuals through 
technological code.8 This private ordering by non-State actors impacts upon 
economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of our lives and can influence 
the conditions pursuant to which fundamental rights are exercised. One example 
of this is the way web 2.0 extends mass communication capabilities – traditionally 
only available to broadcasters – to individuals, thereby enhancing their expressive 
capacity. This extension of expressive capability has the potential to enhance the 
right to freedom of expression of individuals while at the same time it challenges 
the legal framework applicable to free speech.9  
                                                      
1 John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, 8 February 1996, available at 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence (all links last accessed 8 March 2016).  
2 Ibid. 
3 See, for instance, Jack L Goldsmith, ‘Against Cyberanarchy’ (1998) 65 Chicago Law Review 1199, or 
Joel Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology’ 
(1998) 76 Texas Law Review 553.   
4 The PRISM and Tempora surveillance programmes revealed by Edward Snowden illustrate the 
symbiotic relationship between State and corporate data collection and processing. These programmes 
have been subject to legal challenge before domestic and international courts and tribunals (see, for 
example, Liberty & Ors v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs & Ors [2015] UKIPTrib 13 77-H).  
5 For instance, search engine Google has collaborated with several public libraries (including the 
Australian National Library, the Bavarian State library and New York Public Library) as part of the 
Google Books Library Project. For further information about the project and institutional partners, see  
https://www.google.com.au/googlebooks/library/.   
6 For instance, it follows from the EU Court of Justice ruling in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL v AEPD 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 that when determining whether an individual can exercise his or her right to delete 
pursuant to data protection rules, Google (or the data controller) must assess whether an overriding 
public interest in retaining the links to the relevant information exists (at [97]). For a dissection of 
Google’s influence over the subsequent debate see Julia Powles, ‘The Case That Won’t be Forgotten’ 
(2015) Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 583.  
7 Mark A Lemley, ‘Terms of Use’ (2006) Minnesota Law Review 459, and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘Website 
Design as Contract’ (2011) 60 American University Law Review 1635.    
8 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006).  
9 Rowbottom argues that European free speech jurisprudence traditionally protects speech that is in the 
public interest and that the digital dialogue and everyday conversations now captured by laws regulating is 
therefore given inadequate protection. See, Jacob Rowbottom, ‘To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting 
Low Level Digital Speech’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 355. 
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This power of Internet intermediaries – recently labelled ‘platform power’ – 
has been the subject of increasing doctrinal and media attention.10 For instance, 
Cohen has argued that successful state regulation of the information economy will, 
amongst other things, require an ‘analytically sound conception of platform power’ 
and ‘coherent and publicly accountable methods for identifying, describing and 
responding to systemic threats’.11  ‘Platform power’ is also becoming a prominent 
feature on public policy and regulatory agendas, particularly across Europe.12 The 
European Union (EU) pinpointed this issue for further attention in a 2015 
Communication setting out its strategy for a Digital Single Market for Europe. It 
noted that:  
 
Some online platforms have evolved to become players competing in many 
sectors of the economy and the way they use their market power raises a 
number of issues that warrant further analysis beyond the application of 
competition law in specific cases.13 
 
This marks a turning point as, to date, regulators have assumed that the 
application of ex post competition law (or antitrust) rules, designed to ensure that 
companies with market power will not exclude equally efficient competitors or 
engage in exploitation, negates the need for the ex ante regulation of platforms. 
This paper challenges this assumption and highlights how existing legal 
mechanisms, including competition law, may not capture the power over 
communications exercised by digital platforms.  
In order to illustrate this point, and to contribute to the continuing debate on 
platform power, two main claims are advanced. The first claim is that the term 
‘platform power’ fails to reflect the potentially problematic power at the heart of 
the information society. Focus should therefore shift from this concept to the 
identification of concerns raised by the practices of Internet intermediaries. This is 
                                                      
10 Joe Kennedy, ‘Don’t regulate internet platforms, embrace them’, 14 November 2015, EurActiv 
(http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/don-t-regulate-internet-platforms-embrace-them/); 
Tom Fairless, ‘EU Digital Chief Urges Regulation to Nurture European Internet Platforms’, 14 April 
2015, The Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-digital-chief-urges-regulation-to-nurture-
european-internet-platforms-1429009201).  
11 Julie Cohen, ‘The Regulatory State in the Information Age’ (2016) 17(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
(forthcoming). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2714072. Cohen defines ‘platform power’ 
as the ‘power to link facially separate markets and/or to constrain participation in markets by using 
technical protocols.’ 
12 Conseil National du Numerique (CNNum), ‘Platform Neutrality: Building an open and sustainable digital 
environment’, May 2014 (available at http://www.cnnumerique.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/PlatformNeutrality_VA.pdf), 6. The French CNNum acknowledge the ability 
of internet platforms ‘to create great value from the data retrieved from users’, it also states that the use 
of this data must ensure respect for the ‘data rights’ of users and that individuals ‘maintain sole control 
over the repercussions resulting from the use thereof’ and ‘benefit from the use of their data’. It 
concludes that ‘recent events have illustrated that current practices do not make it possible to reach these 
goals.’ 
13 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe’ COM (2015) 192 final, 12. 
                           1/2017 
 
 4 
for three reasons: first, ‘platform’ is a contested and open-ended term making it a 
fluid, and thus inappropriate, target for regulation; second, ‘power’ has been 
interpreted synonymously with economic power to the exclusion of other types of 
power; and, third, although imperfect, a functional rather than a formalistic 
approach is preferred when identifying the targets of regulation. The second claim 
is that blind spots exist when the issue of ‘platform power’ is viewed solely 
through an economic lens. As a result, competition law (which is guided by the 
principles of Chicago School economics) will not necessarily capture and sanction 
practices that negatively impact upon non-economic parameters, such as freedom 
of expression and privacy. Nevertheless, it is necessary to acknowledge that the 
mere existence of regulatory gaps will not, of itself, justify the introduction of 
further measures to regulate platforms.  
 
 
 
2 ‘PLATFORM POWER’: AN INAPPROPRIATE REGULATORY 
TARGET 
 
Analysis of whether ‘platform power’ should be (further14) regulated must be 
reframed if it is to yield valuable regulatory insights in the EU and other 
democratic states struggling with this question. In particular, the concept of 
‘platform’ is fluid and over-inclusive while ‘power’ is often equated to ‘market 
power’ and is thus under-inclusive. Regulatory attention should focus on 
identifying and addressing potentially problematic conduct or processes that may 
require regulation rather than on the nebulous concept of ‘platform power’.  
 
A. THE OVER-INCLUSIVENESS OF THE TERM ‘PLATFORM’  
 
As part of its Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, the European 
Commission launched a consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms 
and intermediaries.15 A central part of the Commission’s investigation, likely 
pursued in response to political pressure16, ‘centred on the question of whether, 
beyond the existing regulatory framework, new regulation for online platforms 
                                                      
14 Platforms are already subject to a broad array of legal and regulatory measures indicating that the 
question posed – should platforms be regulated – may also be incorrect starting point.  
15 European Commission, ‘Public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy’ (September 2015). Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-
platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and-cloud.  
16 Numerous media outlets reported in May 2015 that French and German Ministers for the Economy 
(Emmanuel Macron and Sigmar Gabriel respectively) had written to the Vice President of the European 
Commission requesting such a consultation with the aim of establishing an appropriate general regulatory 
framework. See, for instance, Irish Times, ’Germany and France seek tighter internet regulations’, 1 May 
2015. Available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/germany-and-france-seek-tighter-
internet-regulations-1.2195888.  
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should be introduced’.17 Yet although this and other initiatives are gaining 
momentum, the term ‘platform’ remains contested with little consensus on its 
definition.  
The European Commission’s Digital Single Market Communication does not 
define the term platform however a platform is defined in the Commission’s 
public consultation as ‘an undertaking operating in two (or multi)-sided markets, 
which uses the Internet to enable interactions between two or more distinct but 
interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the 
groups’.18 According to this definition the key characteristic of a platform is two or 
multi-sidedness. Yet, we must query why this feature is sufficient to merit 
regulation.19 First, it is well-established in economic theory that two or multi-
sidedness may lead to positive externalities in the form of direct and indirect 
network effects: that is, ‘greater involvement by agents of at least one type 
increases the value of the platform to agents of the other types’ (indirect network 
effect) or agents of the same type (direct network effects).20 Secondly, multi-
sidedness appears to be an arbitrary feature to target for regulation given that 
businesses can switch from being single-sided to multi-sided, and vice versa, with 
relative ease. For instance, Netflix – which is often labelled a digital platform – 
provides a service only to end-users.21 It is therefore currently a single-sided 
service yet if it changed its revenue model and subsidised its content through 
advertising rather than through subscription fees it would become a two-sided 
platform. We must consider such a change in revenue model should be decisive in 
determining whether or not a digital actor is regulated.  
Other definitions of a platform remove the explicit emphasis on two or 
multi-sidedness.22 For instance, a broader definition was proposed in a study 
commissioned by the European Parliament according to which ‘a digital platform 
provides a (technological) basis for delivering or aggregating services/content 
from service/content providers to end-users’.23 This definition incorporates two 
and multi-sided platforms but seemingly also includes services such as Spotify and 
                                                      
17 House of Lords – Select Committee on the EU, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’, HL 
Paper 129, 20 April 2016, 7.  
18 European Commission, ‘Public consultation on the regulatory environment’ (n 15) 5.  
19 The work of economists on multi-sided markets informs the actions of regulators in the online sphere. 
See, in particular, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ 
(2003)1(4) Journal of the European Economic Association 990, and David S. Evans and Richard 
Schmalenese, ‘The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms’ (2007) Competition 
Policy International 151.  
20 Colin Blackman and Romain Bosc, ‘What is a platform and should they be regulated? Summary report’, 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 17 November 2015. Comments of Nicolai von Gorp, 
(https://www.ceps.eu/sites/default/files/CEPS%20What%20is%20a%20platform_summary%20report.
pdf).   
21 TNO report, ‘Digital platforms: an analytical framework for identifying and evaluating policy options’, 
TNO 2015 R11271, Final report, 11.  
22 Mansell proposes the following definition: a digital platform is a ‘reconfigurable base of compatible 
components on which firms and users build applications’. Robin Mansell, ‘Platforms of power’ (2015) 
43(1) Intermedia 20, 22.  
23 TNO Report, ‘Digital platforms: an analytical framework’ (n 21) 11; European Parliament, ‘Challenges 
for Competition in a Digitalised Economy’, Study for the ECON Committee, July 2015, 7.  
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Netflix that simply offer a service in exchange for remuneration. Yet, even this 
definition appears to provide a simplistic account of the relationship platforms 
facilitate between ‘providers’ and ‘users’.24 Moreover, it fails to shed light on why 
platforms might merit regulation.25 As observed before the House of Lords, other 
than being ‘digital’ (or offering a ‘technological’ basis), it is difficult to discern how 
a digital platform differs from offline ‘platforms’ that offer similar services, such as 
subscription television services and newspapers.  The dividing line between online 
and offline platforms may also become increasingly blurred once an offline 
platform decides to develop an online presence. If the very fact of being ‘digital’ is 
decisive, it remains necessary to articulate why this is the case.  
In an attempt to resolve this definitional dilemma, others have suggested that 
platforms should not be defined but instead classified according to a taxonomy 
based on their characteristics.26 A report commissioned by the Dutch government 
classifies platforms in four broad categories27 but recognises that within these 
categories platforms will differ with regard to characteristics such as their revenue 
model, whether they give rise to network effects, the use of platforms by other 
platforms or applications, geographic dependencies and data and content usage, 
amongst others.28 This approach reflects the fact that the term ‘online platform’ 
can cover a broad range of different types of platforms, the functions and 
characteristics of which could differ considerably.29 While this approach may be 
preferable, without identifying a particular category and combination of 
characteristics that may be problematic, it once again risks being over-
inconclusive. In light of this lack of clarity, it is suggested that it would be 
preferable to identify problematic practices that may require regulation rather than 
focusing on ‘platform power’.30  
                                                      
24 This is evident from the ongoing debate on prosumption sparked in the Web 2.0 context primarily by 
Ritzer and Jurgenson. See, George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson, ‘Production, Consumption, 
Prosumption: The nature of capitalism in the age of the digital “prosumer”’ (2010) 10(1) Journal of 
Consumer Culture 13.  
25 Commentators have argued that it is difficult ‘to identify characteristics uniquely shared by online 
platforms that might merit regulation’. Alex Chisolm – CMA Chief Executive, ‘Platform regulation - 
antitrust law versus sector-specific legislation: evolving our tools and practices to meet the challenges of 
the digital economy’, 27 October 2015.  
26 See Blackman and Bosc, CEPS Report (n 20) 2.  According to this report, the economic literature on 
multi-sided markets suggests that definitions should take into account at least three criteria: the balance of 
contributions; interdependence; control. 
27 These categories are: reseller/distributor; marketplace; social network; and platform of platforms. TNO 
report, ‘Digital Platforms: an analytical framework’ (n 21) 11.  
28 Ibid. 12.  
29 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe - Analysis and 
Evidence’ SWD (2015) 100 final, 16. In that paper, the Commission had defined platforms as ‘software-
based facilities offering two or even multi-sided markets where providers and users of content, goods and 
services can meet’. This was confirmed by European Commission Vice President Ansip who informed 
the House of Lords that there was no single, universally accepted definition of platforms and that ‘when 
different people are talking about platforms, they have a totally different understanding’ of the term. 
House of Lords, ‘Online Platforms’ (n 17) 48. 
30 This is a point that was made to the House of Lords by several contributors to its investigation into 
online platforms. TechUK suggested that the broad definition of platform is ‘not instructive in 
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B. THE UNDER-INCLUSIVENESS OF THE TERM ‘POWER’  
 
The second problem with the notion of ‘platform power’ is that the power at stake 
is equated to the narrow concept of ‘market power’. ‘Market power’ is a familiar 
concept to competition lawyers who assess its presence by reference to established 
price-based tests.31 A relevant market must first be defined by identifying what 
products and services compete for consumers before market power on that 
market is assessed. An undertaking (an entity engaged in an economic activity32) is 
deemed to have market power on a relevant market when it is in a position to act 
independently of its competitors, consumers and end-users on that market.33  
As Cohen notes, this assessment of market power and market distortion – 
dating from the industrial era – assumes that industries are well-defined, markets 
and choices are ascertainable and that discrete harms exist on these markets that 
will be amenable to targeted regulatory responses.34 These concepts have however 
been disrupted by the shift to an information economy. For example, pursuant to 
competition law, only entities that are engaged in ‘economic activity’ can have 
‘market power’. However, market power in the digital context may be a more 
complex, compound concept given the way new products and services are offered 
to individuals by building on existing offerings, and through a mixture of 
economic and solidarity-based initiatives.35 Moreover, as mentioned above, the 
primary tool for market definition is a price-based demand-side substitutability 
test, which gauges the reactions of consumers to small but significant price 
increases. If consumers would switch from product or service A to product or 
service B in the event of such a price increase, A and B compete on the same 
relevant market. Such a price-based test may be appropriate to measure the 
competitive relationship between fruit or laptops where prices are visible and 
understood by consumers. However, in markets where offerings are free at the 
point of access but subsidised through advertising or other revenue streams, 
traditional tools for market definition seem an odd-fit.  
A further difficulty with equating power to ‘market power’ is that economists 
often fail to agree on whether market power exists.36 Market power is measured by 
                                                                                                                                       
identifying specific problems that may occur in relation to specific platform functions and businesses’ 
while Airbnb told the Committee that the notion of a platform does not ‘necessarily illuminate any cross-
cutting regulatory issues that may need to be addressed’. House of Lords, Report on Online Platforms (n 
17) 21. 
31 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law OJ [1997] C 372/5.  
32 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH (23/04/1991) ECR I-1979, [21]. 
33 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207.  
34 Cohen, ‘The Regulatory State in the Information Age’ (n 11) 4-5.  
35 For instance, Balkin describes how the Internet facilitates ‘glomming on’: a strategy whereby things are 
appropriated from mass media and then used (for commentary, criticism, and to produce and construct 
things with them. Jack Balkin, ‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society’ (2004) 79(1) NYU Law Review 1, 10-12. Wikipedia might be one 
example of this process in action.  
36 In a recent judgment involving an alleged abuse of dominance by Google Inc, Roth J noted of the 
economic experts before the Court that ‘both have undoubted expertise in this field, but I found that 
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looking at an array of factors, including the market share of companies operating 
on the relevant market and the structure and dynamics of that market. Even in the 
presence of high market shares, it is often argued that companies are unable to 
exert market power due to the constant threat of competition from emerging and 
new entrants as a result of low barriers to entry. For instance, whether assets such 
as computing resources and large datasets can constitute barriers to entry is highly 
contested. Tucker and Wellford argue that significant datasets ‘have become so 
inexpensive as to be an option even for the prototypical garage-based start-up 
company’ as ‘relevant data are widely available and often free’.37  From this 
perspective, competition is just a click away.38  Others, such as Pasquale, argue that 
hopes of such a wave of creative destruction are naïve in view of the economies of 
scale and network effects evident in some digital markets. He suggests that ‘even 
with millions in venture capital funding, even with computing space leased from 
Amazon, a start-up with valuable new search technology is far, far more likely to 
be bought up by Google than to displace it’.39 Arguments over whether market 
power exists therefore appear intractable. In keeping with the teachings of the 
Chicago School, competition authorities and regulators are encouraged to adopt a 
cautious, non-interventionist approach lest intervention given rise to detrimental 
‘false positives’, and departure from this orthodoxy to investigate abuses of market 
power in digital markets is often met with allegations of economic protectionism 
on the part of relevant regulators.40  
The most compelling argument against equating the ‘power’ in ‘platform 
power’ to market power is therefore that the concept of market power is too 
narrow. Intuitively, individuals and regulators may sense that a digital company has 
‘power’ even when market power is not present. For instance, most users would 
guess that the social networking site Facebook, which has 1.59 billion active users 
worldwide and privileged access to associated data streams, is in a position of 
market power. However, this position of power might not translate to a finding of 
‘market power’ using the tests outlined above. In the past, competition authorities 
have not explicitly defined the user-side of the market for multi-sided services like 
Facebook and have instead focused on markets such as the market for online 
                                                                                                                                       
each displayed a tendency to become an advocate for the party by which he was instructed.’ Streetmap.EU 
Ltd v Google Inc. & Ors [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch), at [47].    
37 Darren S Tucker and Hill B. Wellford, ‘Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data’, Antitrust Source, American 
Bar Association, December 2014, 1.  
38 To illustrate this point, reference is made to social media services such as MySpace and Bebo that once 
occupied visible market positions but are now virtually extinct. This example is at best inconclusive. At its 
peak, MySpace had 75.9 million users. Bebo has 117 million registered users (most of whom are not 
active). Facebook currently has 1.59 billion active users. 
39 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society – The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information (Harvard 
University Press, 2015), 82.  
40 Arthur Nelson, ‘Google faces antitrust action from EU competition watchdog’, 15 April 2015. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/apr/15/google-faces-antitrust-action-
from-eu-competition-watchdog.  
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behavioural advertising.41 In such markets, Facebook may have many competitors 
and a finding of market power is not evident.42 The initial challenge is therefore to 
find a term to describe the type of power that Internet intermediaries may exert.  
 
C. FROM ‘PLATFORM POWER’ TO GATEKEEPER  
 
According to Mansell, specific attention is devoted to those digital platforms that 
operate as ‘market makers – or orchestrators – in the digital ecology value chain’.43 
These market makers play a ‘pivotal role in the digital ecosystem’ as a result of 
factors such as their size, business model and connection capacity.44 Platforms 
may be in such a pivotal position if they are vital to the functioning of other 
platforms: they may have assets – such as an operating system or user-base – that 
are required by other entities to compete.45 Such control over access to software 
or to end-users may place some platforms in a position of market power46 and, if 
so, the actions of the platform vis-à-vis other businesses might cause harm to 
competition. For instance, a pivotal platform could manipulate the processing and 
presentation of information to its own commercial advantage47, or exercise its 
discretion to withdraw access to its infrastructure or users without warning.48 
Competition law would intervene to end these practices if, overall, they had a net 
negative impact on ‘consumer welfare’ and led to, for instance, increased price or 
lower quality products.49 However, it is suggested that platforms that control 
access to infrastructure and users, and are therefore in a ‘pivotal position’, may 
also have implications for individuals that are not captured by economic and 
                                                      
41 See, for instance, the Commission’s market definition in the Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business merger 
(COMP/M.5727 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business) paras 85-87.  
42 Pasquale accuses some scholarship of promoting the ‘structural production of ignorance’, by 
‘characterising scenarios as “consent” and “competition” when they are experienced by consumers and 
users as coercive and manipulative’. Frank Pasquale, ‘Privacy, Antitrust and Power’ (2013) George Mason 
Law Review 1009, 1011.  
43 Mansell, ‘Platforms of Power’ (n 22) 25.  
44 This is noted in a document prepared by EU digital commissioner Günther Oettinger’s office that was 
leaked to the press (see further, Quartz, ‘These documents reveal the EU’s thoughts on regulating 
Google, Facebook, and other platforms’, 23 April 2015, http://qz.com/389905/these-documents-reveal-
the-eus-thoughts-on-regulating-google-facebook-and-other-platforms/). This internal document 
(available here: http://oehv.at/OEHV/files/92/92af2b4c-b0b0-4e33-97ee-30cc7d9fad8c.pdf ) notes that  
in the near future ‘only a very limited part of the economy will not depend on them in the near future’ 
and therefore queries whether they might be labelled ‘systemic actors’.  
45 TNO report, ‘Digital Platforms’ (n 21) 14.  
46 Ibid. The French CNNum has observed that ‘certain platforms have managed to stand out from 
competitors by … maintaining control over each point in their user access channels, ie. Internet 
browsers, logistics, operating systems, terminals and other connected devices, etc.’ CNNum, ‘Platform 
Neutrality’ (n 12) 5. 
47 European Commission, DSM – leaked document (n 44) 2.  
48 Ibid.  
49 According to the European Commission in its Guidance on Article 102 TFEU consumer welfare 
means that consumers ‘benefit from competition through lower prices, better quality and a wider choice 
of new or improved goods and services’ (European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings OJ [2009] C 45/7, [5]).  
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competition law analysis. These implications are better reflected by the 
‘gatekeeper’ notion than by the concept of ‘platform power’.  
The concept of a network ‘gatekeeper’, credited to Barzilai-Nahon, is not 
exclusive to the digital environment.50 At its most simple, a ‘gatekeeper’ 
determines what can, and cannot, pass through a gate. Laidlaw further specifies 
that gatekeepers are non-state actors that have the capacity to alter the behaviour 
of others in circumstances where the state has limited capacity to do the same.51 
This movement away from state actors towards the exercise of quasi-regulatory 
powers by private actors leaves a potential gap that regulatory initiatives in the 
field are grappling to define and to fill. Laidlaw argues that traditional gatekeeper 
theory sees the gatekeeper as ‘somehow uninvolved, or the gated as being 
unaffected, at least in the sense that the focus is purely on gated misconduct rather 
than gated rights as well’.52 She therefore proposes a more dynamic assessment of 
internet gatekeepers, differentiating between two types: ‘Internet gatekeepers’ who 
control information flows and ‘Internet information gatekeepers’ which as a result 
of this function of controlling information flows can have an impact on 
‘participation and deliberation in democratic culture’. While we might impose 
liability on Internet gatekeepers for their failure to take a particular action (for 
instance, acting expeditiously to take down defamatory content from their 
platform), she argues that additional responsibilities can be imposed on ‘Internet 
information gatekeepers’ given their ‘power and control over the flow, content 
and accessibility of information’.53 It is this latter concept that is of relevance in 
this context. Although an Internet information gatekeeper (hereafter gatekeeper) 
may have ‘market power’ in the sense outlined above, such power is not 
indispensable: ‘gatekeeper’ theory is concerned with power over information 
flows. Gatekeeper power is therefore distinct from market power in terms of how 
it is measured, and in terms of its potential impact on the rights and interests of 
individuals.  
The notion of a gatekeeper, as expanded upon by Laidlaw, therefore offers a 
more accurate account of online power than the concept of ‘platform power’. 
However, two alterations to Laidlaw’s theory are suggested here. First, the 
paradigm of ‘influence on democratic culture’ Laidlaw uses to justify the 
imposition of more robust responsibilities on Internet information gatekeepers 
may not perfectly reflect the concerns gatekeepers entail. It could, for instance, be 
considered that any action of a gatekeeper that hinders individual autonomy or 
dignity might merit regulatory attention even in the absence of an influence on 
                                                      
50 Karine Barzilai-Nahon, ‘Toward a theory of network gatekeepeing: A framework for exploring 
information control’ (2008) 59(9) Journal of the American Society for Information Science and 
Technology 1493.  
51 Emily Laidlaw, ‘A framework for identifying Internet information gatekeepers’ (2010) 24(3) 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 263, 265.  
52 Laidlaw, ‘Internet information gatekeepers’ (n 51) 267.  
53 Ibid. 266. 
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democratic culture. Secondly, gatekeeping in the digital context implies more than 
merely control over information flows. As Helberger et al argue, much of the 
concern regarding the influence of gatekeepers lies in their control over access to 
individuals and the way in which the relationship between gatekeepers and users is 
shaped, rather than their control over access to information.54  This echoes 
Zuboff’s claim that if ‘power was once identified with the ownership of the means 
of production, it is now identified with the ownership of the means of behavioural 
modification’.55 It is this broader notion of gatekeeper, encompassing these two 
alterations, that is preferred in this paper.  
The shift in focus from ‘platform power’ to the consequences of the actions 
of ‘gatekeepers’ is not purely cosmetic. It entails a shift from an entirely structural 
approach (focusing on platforms because they are multi-sided or digital, for 
instance) to an approach that also encompasses functional aspects (focusing on 
gatekeepers because of their role in controlling the flow and accessibility of 
information and structuring the digital environment). Thus, this approach has the 
benefit of displacing a specific technology – namely, platforms – as a regulatory 
target and instead focusing on potentially problematic functions. As Bennett-
Moses highlights, new technologies beg the question of how they fit into ‘a pre-
existing legal and regulatory landscape’ and ‘thinking of the problem in terms of 
“regulating technologies” seems to begin the story at the wrong time.’56 However, 
the very fact of being a gatekeeper is not sufficient in itself to justify regulation. 
This forces us to consider whether gatekeepers raise distinct regulatory concerns 
that may justify alterations to the regulatory regime that currently sustains 
gatekeepers.  
In the next section, two sets of concerns regarding digital gatekeepers will be 
identified and examined: first, concerns regarding access to and presentation of 
content and services and, second, concerns regarding data processing and 
profiling. These concerns are not exhaustive. Rather, these examples serve merely 
to illustrate that not all harms to individuals are captured by the ex post 
application of competition rules, or visible from a purely economic perspective. In 
particular, rights such as freedom of expression, data protection, privacy and 
autonomy are not given any additional weight in economic analysis despite their 
normative importance. This is an important point as opponents to regulation 
argue that it is unnecessary given the potential for ex post competition law 
intervention. If competition law cannot capture these concerns, then it cannot act 
as a viable alternative to regulation.   
 
 
                                                      
54 Natali Helberger, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw and Rob van der Noll, ‘Regulating the new 
information intermediaries as gatekeepers of information diversity’ 2015 (17)(6) Info 50, 51.  
55 Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information civilization’ 
(2015) 30 Journal of Information Technology 75, 82.  
56 Lyria Bennett-Moses, ‘How to Think about Law, Regulation and Technology: Problems with 
“Technology” as a Regulatory Target’ (2013) 5(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 1, 17.  
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3 A THEORY OF ‘GATEKEEPER’ HARM? 
 
The concerns motivating calls for the regulation of platform power differ 
dramatically, ranging from commercial concerns (that a platform will quash 
competition, for instance) to social concerns (for example, that platforms are 
exploiting their ‘suppliers’ by classifying them as independent contractors rather 
than employees57). As Cohen notes, we do not yet have coherent methods to 
identify or describe systemic threats in the information society.58 Moreover, there 
are obstacles to identifying potential concerns stemming from the activities of 
gatekeepers: most evidently, the opacity surrounding the actions and offerings of 
gatekeepers makes it difficult to identify potentially harmful conduct, or to assess 
its scale. For instance, it is difficult for users of search engine services to evaluate 
the quality of the search results they obtain, or to know whether these results are 
‘neutral’ or are designed to engender a particular reaction.59 This is coupled with 
the problem that the concerns identified are diffuse and lack a common thread or 
unifying theme. Their articulation is consequently more complicated and 
potentially less compelling, particularly when compared to the tangible benefits 
society derives from platforms60 and the quantifiable costs of regulating. Bearing 
these challenges in mind, this section examines two examples in order to highlight 
that gatekeepers can have an influence on human rights and freedoms, such as 
freedom of expression, privacy, data protection and freedom of association, and 
that this influence falls into a blind spot when the activities of gatekeepers are 
viewed solely through the lens of neoclassical economic theory.  
 
A. GATEKEEPER CONTROL OVER ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
Gatekeepers control information flows and access to individuals and shape the 
relationship between users and platforms. There are some limited exceptions to 
this monopoly, for instance States may prohibit access to or possession of certain 
content such as child abuse images61, yet even in these circumstances the State 
often enlists the help of a gatekeeper in order to police and enforce these laws, for 
example in the Internet Watch Foundation helps the State to combat the 
                                                      
57 Joe Kennedy, ‘Why Internet Platforms Don’t Need Special Regulation’, Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation (ITIF) report, 8. Available at http://www2.itif.org/2015-internet-
platforms.pdf?_ga=1.28755130.780822210.1457138296.  
58 Cohen, ‘The Regulatory State in the Information Age’ (n 11) 5. 
59 See, for instance, Mark R Patterson, ‘Google and Search Engine Market Power’ Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology – Occasional Paper Series, July 2013 1, 11 and 25. Patterson suggests that search 
engine results are, in part, credence goods: it is difficult for customers to evaluate them even after they 
have been used.  
60 Oxera, ‘Benefits of online platforms’ (prepared for Google) October 2015. Available at: 
http://www.oxera.com/getmedia/84df70f3-8fe0-4ad1-b4ba-d235ee50cb30/The-benefits-of-online-
platforms-main-findings-(October-2015).pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf.  
61 See, s. 160(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.  
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dissemination of child abuse images.62 In a digital world, gatekeepers therefore 
have primary responsibility for enabling or disabling our access to and 
dissemination of information as well as for determining the terms on which this 
access and dissemination occurs. In practice therefore gatekeepers determine the 
extent to which individuals can enjoy the benefits of established rights and 
freedoms, such as the right to freedom of expression. For instance, it is widely 
accepted that the ‘power to include, exclude and rank is the power to ensure that 
certain public impressions become permanent, while others remain fleeting’.63 
Similarly, the suggestions offered by ‘autocomplete’ tools by gatekeepers can 
influence individual perceptions.64 This potential to impact public perception has 
implications for fundamental rights that are not captured by a purely economics-
based approach, such as that taken by competition law. An example will illustrate 
this point: the exclusion of rights-enhancing applications from operating systems 
controlled by gatekeepers.  
 
i. Exclusion of content by gatekeepers  
Gatekeepers can allow or prevent providers of content, goods and services from 
accessing individuals. If a gatekeeper blocks the route between providers and 
individuals this action may have a negative impact on certain rights and policy 
interests. Most significantly, gatekeepers have a direct impact on the rights to 
privacy and data protection as a result of their role in setting privacy and data use 
conditions for all applications using their software. The UK Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA) has noted that operating systems are:  
 
responsible for the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) which 
dictate how the software and hardware interact – including what 
information the app can access. APIs control the release of information 
according to the privacy controls in place at the [operating system] level.65  
 
The operating system gatekeeper therefore determines to what extent key data 
protection principles are promoted. Reports suggest that gatekeepers are doing 
little to promote key data protection principles, such as data minimisation66, 
                                                      
62 For further information on the activities of the Internet Watch Foundation visit: 
https://www.iwf.org.uk/.  
63 Pasquale, The Black Box Society (n 39) 14.  
64 Consider the controversy in the UK when it was reported that Google search engine’s failure to offer a 
suggested ‘autocomplete’ search term when individuals entered the words ‘Conservatives are’ in the 
search engine yet offered several autocomplete suggestions when terms relating to rival political parties 
(for instance, ‘Labour are’) were entered into the search engine. The New Statesman, ‘Why doesn’t 
Google autocomplete “Conservatives are...”?’, 3 February 2016. Available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/media/2016/02/why-doesn-t-google-autocomplete-
conservatives-are.   
65 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data: Report on the CMA’s call for information’, CMA38, 
June 2015, 42.  
66 Article 6(1)(c) of the Data Protection Directive (European Parliament and Council Directive 46/EC of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
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amongst application providers. For example, a 2014 survey conducted by the 
Global Privacy Enforcement Network (GPEN) discovered that one third of all 
applications requested an excessive number of permissions to access additional 
personal information.67 Moreover, the FTC has also taken actions against 
applications such as Brightest Flashlight and Snapchat in recent years for 
misrepresenting how the personal data they gather is used.68 In addition to 
determining the terms on which applications can operate (and process data), 
gatekeepers can also demand that applications provide them with access to 
customer data. For instance, it is well documented that the Financial Times 
withdrew its application from the Apple App store when it was forced to provide 
Apple with its consumer data. The news provider went on to launch a Web-based 
version of its mobile app in a bid to retain reader interest.69 Smaller news outlets 
have chosen not to provide an app in a bid to retain custody of their user data.70 
Gatekeepers can also have a significant indirect impact on the rights of 
individuals by blocking the route between individuals and providers. Pasquale 
provides the example of Apple’s exclusion of the ‘Drone +’ application from its 
App Store. The Drone + application provided users with real-time alerts of drone 
strikes reported in the media. In this way, users of the application who wished to 
gain access to publicly available information about under-reported military drone 
strikes could obtain it in a user-friendly format. The application was rejected from 
the App Store twice: first on the grounds that it was ‘not useful’ and subsequently 
on the basis that it was ‘objectionable and crude’.71 The exclusion of the 
application illustrates that the actions of gatekeepers can have an impact on 
opinion formation and the autonomy of Internet users72 and that gatekeeper 
transparency is this critical.73 It might be argued that other sources of this 
information remained available, and that all editorial decision-making necessarily 
implies the exclusion of some information. What is different in this context is the 
                                                                                                                                       
the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/23) states that personal data must be ‘not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed’.  
67 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 65) 123.  
68 Ibid. 123-124.  
69 Reuters, ‘Financial Times pulls its apps from Apple Store’, 31 August 2011 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-ft-idUSTRE77U1O020110831).  
70 Helberger et al, ‘Regulating the new information intermediaries’ (n 54) 56.  
71 Pasquale, The Black Box Society (n 39) 62.  
72 Competition lawyers reject the suggestion made by some authors that Google could be likened to 
public utilities (such as rail or electricity providers) or essential facilities. See, for instance, Marina Lao, 
‘Search, Essential Facilities and the Antitrust Duty to Deal’ (2013) Northwestern Journal of Technology 
and Intellectual Property 275.  
73 The recent controversy following the ‘revelation’ that Facebook uses human curators in order to shape 
the ‘Facebook trends’ feature also illustrates the opacity of the operations of gatekeepers and the 
consequent lack of understanding of these operations. See, Sam Thielman, ‘Facebook news selection is in 
hands of editors not algorithms, documents show’, The Guardian, 12 May 2016 
(https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/12/facebook-trending-news-leaked-documents-
editor-guidelines) or Deepa Seetharaman, ‘Facebook’s Curators Shape “Trending” News Feature’ Wall 
Street Journal, 12 May 2016 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-curators-shape-trending-news-
feature-1463095472).  
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role of Apple’s architecture (or code) in the decision-making context. Apple 
devices are automatically, and necessarily, routed through the Apple App Store 
‘walled garden’.74 Apple’s choices are therefore the choices of the user, and the 
user should be aware of the factors informing Apple’s decisions to include and 
exclude from its App Store. As Mansell suggests, ‘citizens cannot choose to view 
what they are not aware of or to protest about the absence of content which they 
cannot discover’.75  
A complaint filed with the European Commission by the provider of a 
privacy enhancing technology (PET) provides a further illustration of how 
gatekeepers can influence the extent to which individuals can exercise their rights. 
Disconnect complained to the Commission that Google had excluded one its 
applications from Android’s Google Play application store thereby abusing its 
position of market power on the market for mobile handset operating systems.76 It 
argued that this exclusion from the Google Play store unfairly discriminated 
against its application and gave Google’s own rival software a competitive 
advantage. The Disconnect application in question prevents third parties from 
tracking Android users when they browse the web or use applications on their 
devices. This tracking is used to gather data to improve the targeting of advertising 
but can also facilitate the installation of malware on devices. Google responded 
informally by highlighting that it applies its policies consistently to all applications 
and that it has ‘long prohibited apps that interfere with other apps – such as 
altering their functionality, or removing their way of making money’.77 It also 
emphasised that there are over 200 privacy applications available in Google Play 
that comply with its policies. This example again illustrates the indirect impact that 
gatekeepers can have on the exercise of rights: by blocking a PET – a technology 
designed to enhance privacy – a gatekeeper can make it more cumbersome for an 
individual to exercise privacy and data protection rights. While again the impact on 
rights might be minimal given the availability of competing PETs, again it 
highlights that in the absence of an objective and transparently applied policy for 
the inclusion of applications on a (gatekeeper) software platform, the gatekeeper 
can have an impact on the rights of individuals.  
 
 
                                                      
74 A ‘walled garden’ is a closed environment (for instance, an operating system) where the operator 
controls access to the applications, content and services that can be accessed. By only allowing approved 
apps into the Apple App Store, Apple seeks to ensure better interoperability, synching and security 
however this closed system may also limit user autonomy. Brian Meyer, ‘Why is iOS a Walled Garden?’, 
Apple Gazette, 13 November 2013 (http://www.applegazette.com/opinion/why-does-apple-hide-ios-in-
a-walled-garden/).  
75 Mansell, ‘Platforms of power’ (n 22) 8.  
76 Alistair Barr, ‘App Maker Files EU Complaint Against Google, Alleging Abuse of Android 
Dominance’, 1 June 2015. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/app-maker-files-eu-complaint-
against-google-alleging-abuse-of-android-dominance-1433204706#:mdP9UIcFB3W9ZA.  
77 Foo Yun Chee, ‘Privacy app maker files EU antitrust complaint against Google’, 2 June 2015. Available 
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-google-antitrust-idUSKBN0OI1Z220150602.  
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ii. The limits of a purely economic approach 
It is clear from the Drone + and Disconnect examples above that the actions of 
the gatekeeper have the potential to enhance the effectiveness of fundamental 
rights, or at the other end of the spectrum, lead to their breach. Competition law is 
not designed to capture these fundamental rights implications. For example, for 
Disconnect’s complaint to clear the first hurdle, a competition authority would 
need to establish that Google’s Android operating system has market power. 
Despite its high market shares, it has been argued that Android’s market power is 
‘weaker than supposed’ because it competes directly with other operating systems 
‘every time a consumer buys a new phone’ on the basis of the ‘number and quality 
of the apps available’.78 Thus, an operating system would become less attractive to 
users if it excluded (arbitrarily or otherwise) applications from its operating 
system.79 This logic assumes that individuals make their decision to buy a 
particular handset based on the applications offered. However, in reality a 
multitude of factors are at play, with the choice of applications playing a minor 
role when compared to considerations such as price and handset quality. More 
importantly, such an argument ignores the reality of information asymmetries 
(how many users know that the Drone+ application has been excluded from the 
Apple app store?) and consumer lock-in (consumers may only have the 
opportunity to change providers infrequently due to contractual and other 
practical constraints, such as network coverage). Given these variables, even 
establishing a position of market power may be impossible for competition 
authorities.  
However, even if a competition authority could establish that a gatekeeper 
had market power, competition analysis would not capture intangible harms, such 
as harms to fundamental rights. Rather, competition law seeks to protect specified 
parameters of competition – namely price, quality, choice and innovation – that 
enhance ‘consumer welfare’. An example will illustrate this point. In its 
Facebook/Whatsapp merger decision, the European Commission concluded that 
Facebook’s acquisition of instant messaging service Whatsapp would not impede 
effective competition between the two companies.80 It was able to reach this 
conclusion as it held that Facebook and Whatsapp were not close competitors 
(and competition could not be impeded when it does not exist). However, an 
argument could be made that the consolidation of data sets facilitated by this 
merger impedes effective individual control over personal data as individuals 
would not have anticipated such consolidation and may lack the power (and 
information) to contest this acquisition or mitigate its effects. For those who 
objected to the acquisition on fundamental rights grounds, the only option was to 
withdraw from Facebook and Whatsapp services. In short, the result was 
                                                      
78 ITIF, ‘Why Internet Platforms Don’t Need Special Regulation’ (n 57) 10. 
79 Ibid.  
80  COMP/M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, [191].  
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impoverished choice for individuals regarding the terms of their data use yet this 
result was unproblematic from a competition law perspective.81  
Competition scholars will rightly argue that it is not the role of competition 
law to tackle such fundamental rights concerns. This being so, competition law 
should not be offered as a solution to all problems caused by gatekeeper practices. 
These examples also caution against a purely economic approach to the question 
of gatekeeper regulation, as encouraged by some stakeholders.82 Such an approach 
may lead to blind spots as the ‘rights-enhancing’ role of the applications is not 
given any additional normative weight: for instance, a PET would be treated in the 
same way as an application that provides transport information or a digital abacus. 
Indeed, a PET may even be viewed as inefficient as it blocks flows of information 
that are assumed by many regulators to promote efficiencies. For instance, the 
CMA suggests that efficient markets may involve data sharing to ‘minimise the 
costs in multiple firms collecting, storing and processing the same data multiple 
times’ and failing to share, sell or license personal data may ‘be a further source of 
inefficiency in data markets, leading to increased costs for consumers and firms’.83 
This presumption that increasing flows of information and data sharing is efficient 
may, of course, be contested. For example, data sharing can also increase costs 
when data need to be corrected or updated in order to render them accurate. Yet, 
even if this PET is economically inefficient, it renders data protection rights more 
effective by allowing individuals to easily express their data processing preferences 
and have the application assess whether these preferences are respected by other 
applications and services the individual wishes to use. PETs thus give individuals 
more control over their personal data. 
More fundamentally, the Disconnect example highlights that when there is a 
conflict between gatekeeper and societal interests, gatekeeper interests will prevail. 
As Mansell notes a ‘platform owner’s interest is in aggregating content and 
shaping traffic flows ultimately to achieve profits and to command high visibility 
in the media marketplace ecology’.84 In other words, it is the duty of gatekeepers 
to advance the interests of their shareholders. While it is recognised that these 
interests may be multi-faceted given the numerous, diverse shareholders in the 
context of complex corporate structures, it remains that these private interests 
may not align with public policy objectives and where they do not the former will 
prevail.85 Therefore, when there is a tension between the monetary and the 
                                                      
81 Pasquale has critiqued this emphasis in the context of other transactions, arguing that by ‘focusing 
myopically on efficiency gains that can be temporary or exaggerated, [competition authorities] gloss over 
the long-term pathologies of corporate concentration.’ Pasquale, ‘Privacy, Antitrust and Power’ (n 42) 
1010.  
82 For instance, Microsoft has expressed its hope that the Commission’s work in this field ‘produces a 
thorough, thoughtful, economically-grounded analysis of the complex and multi-sided platform 
ecosystem’. House of Lords, ‘Online Platforms’ (n 17) 14.  
83 CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data’ (n 65) 75.  
84 Mansell, ‘Platforms of power’ (n 22) 22.  
85 Indeed, Zuboff goes further and argues that surveillance capitalism (which she defines as the emergent 
logic of accumulation in the networked sphere) thrives on the public’s ignorance. Zuboff, ‘Surveillance 
capitalism’ (n 55) 83. 
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dignitary value of personal data, the rational gatekeeper can be expected to further 
its own interests.86 One of the over-arching problems here is that we have limited 
knowledge of when such conflicts occur, and how they are handled.87 This is 
something that Pasquale highlights in relation to Apple’s exclusion of the Drone+ 
app:  ‘although the “objectionable content” guidelines at Apple are well publicized, 
the way they are applied is not’ leaving decisions on what applications to exclude 
from the App Store to arbitrary discretion. 
Thus it can be seen that gatekeepers control what content we access and the 
terms on which this content can be accessed. The terms on which this control is 
exercised are under-publicised and individuals therefore lack the knowledge and 
power to have a disciplining influence on gatekeepers. This control can have 
ramifications for fundamental rights that are not captured by competition law 
analysis due to their nature (intangible implications) and scale (while they may have 
significant consequences for some individuals, they may be deemed minimal in 
overall terms).  
 
B. GATEKEEPER CONTROL OVER PERSONAL DATA PROCESSING 
 
By definition, gatekeepers control – amongst other things – information flows, 
including flows of personal data. Flows of personal data are, to a large extent, 
regulated by data protection legislation.88 This legislation applies when ‘personal 
data’ are ‘processed’.89 ‘Personal data’ and ‘processing’ are broadly defined and, as 
a result, many of the potential harms of data processing by gatekeepers may be 
captured by data protection legislation. For instance, the concentration of data in 
the hands of a gatekeeper, like other organisations, may entail a heightened risk of 
data security breach.90 Provisions in data protection legislation (theoretically) 
mitigate such a risk by placing an obligation on data controllers to respect the 
principle of data minimisation and to ensure that data processing systems are 
structurally robust.91 This is just one of multiple examples that illustrates how the 
                                                      
86 ‘As middlemen, they specialize in shifting alliances, sometimes advancing the interests of customers, 
sometimes suppliers: all to orchestrate an online world that maximizes their own profits’. Pasquale, The 
Black Box Society (n 39) 5.  
87 Ibid. 61.  
88 In particular, the Data Protection Directive (n 66).  
89 Personal data is defined in Article 2(a) of the Directive as ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person’ while ‘processing of personal data’ is defined in Article 2(b) as ‘any operation 
or set of operations which is performed upon personal data’.  
90 CtrlShift, ‘The data driven economy: Toward sustainable growth’, 16. Available at: 
http://thedatadriveneconomy.com/. Daniel Solove, ‘Identity Theft, Privacy and the Architecture of 
Vulnerability’ (2003) 54 Hastings Law Journal 1, 28. 
91  For instance, under EU data protection legislation ‘appropriate technical and organisational measures’ 
must be adopted to protect against ‘accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration of 
data’. The Court of Justice has held that such principles of data protection and data security constitute the 
essence of the EU Charter right to data protection. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung 
and Others [2014] ECR I-238, [39].  
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activities of gatekeepers are regulated by data protection law. However, the 
strategic role of gatekeepers in the personal data processing ecosystem can have 
detrimental effects on individuals that are not captured by data protection law, as 
shall be outlined below.  
 
i. Gatekeeper power and profiling practices  
By collecting and sorting data, gatekeepers can profile users of their platforms, and 
in this way individuals become visible or legible to gatekeepers.92 The techniques 
used to profile or categorise individuals have been clearly outlined by the CMA in 
its report on uses of consumer data, and by the FTC in its report on data 
brokers.93 The broader implications of this profiling have also been widely 
discussed.94 However, there are several implications that may be particularly acute 
in the context of gatekeeper data processing that merit further consideration.  
One of the primary concerns regarding gatekeepers is their potentially 
superior ability to profile individuals based on what Pasquale labels a ‘self-
reinforcing data advantage’.95 This profiling facilitates personalisation which in 
turn leads to a risk of ‘filter bubble’96: that individuals will be offered content and 
services that appeal to their current interests, thereby consolidating and reinforcing 
existing prejudices and preferences.  
In addition to this risk, profiling can enable gatekeepers to differentiate and 
discriminate between individuals as well as to manipulate them. An important 
source of personal data to profile individuals is data gathered online, via tools such 
as first and third party cookies, about browsing and purchasing patterns of 
individuals. These profiles are used to categorise individuals according to their 
perceived interests, personal characteristics and socio-economic status amongst 
others. Tailored goods and services are then offered to individuals on the basis of 
this categorisation. This categorisation may escape the application of data 
protection legislation if, on the basis of the profile, the individual is no longer 
identifiable.97 As proponents of behavioural advertising regularly assert, an 
                                                      
92 Linnet Taylor, ‘Data subjects or data citizens? Addressing the global regulatory challenge of big data’ in 
Freedom and Property of Information: The Philosophy of Law Meets the Philosophy of Technology (Mireille Hildebrandt 
and Bibi van den Berg, eds, forthcoming 2016).  
93 FTC, ‘Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability’, May 2014; and, CMA, CMA, ‘The 
commercial use of consumer data’ (n 65).  
94 See, for instance, Frederik Borgesius, ‘Improving Privacy Protection in the Area of Behavioural 
Targeting’ (Kluwer, 2015); Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’ (2016) 104  
California Law Review 671. 
95 Pasquale, ‘Privacy, Antitrust and Power’ (n 42) 1015.  
96 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You, (Viking, London, 2011). 
97 For instance, if a third-party cookie tracks an individual across a range of interconnected websites 
collecting consumer data as the individual browses, it may not necessarily be possible to link this data 
back to an identifiable individual. In this instance, data protection legislation would not apply to the 
resultant profile as it is not ‘personal data’. See, Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Big Data’s End 
Run Around Procedural Privacy Protections’ Communications of the ACM, Vol. 57 No. 11: November 
2014, and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Singling Out People Without Knowing Their Names – 
Behavioural Targeting, Pseudonymous Data, and the New Data Protection Regulation’ (February 16, 
2016) (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733115).  
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advertiser has no interest in the actual identity of an individual.98 Rather, an 
advertiser is simply concerned with being able to determine whether an individual 
is more likely than others to be interested in, or to pay more for, a particular type 
of good or service. It is the ability to differentiate between ‘individually’ aggregated 
patterns of purchase and search rather than to identify individuals that is 
important. Therefore, if an individual attends marriage counselling and is profiled 
on this basis, a credit card company does not need to know his name, or the name 
of his partner, in order to offer him higher priced insurance products. The mere 
fact of falling within a ‘attends marriage counselling’ category may be sufficient to 
classify an individual as more likely to default when offering insurance products.99 
As mentioned above, such anonymous profiling will fall outside the scope of data 
protection regulation. Moreover, tailoring the goods and services offered to 
individuals in this manner may not amount to discrimination: this is because it 
does not differentiate between individuals on the basis of protected characteristics 
such as race, gender, religion and age.  
This differentiation may be problematic for different reasons. Profiling can 
be used to differentiate between consumers based on the quality or the price of 
goods and services offered to them. As the CMA notes, the ‘collection of 
consumer data may enable firms to make judgments about the lowest level of 
quality needed by consumers/groups of similar consumers. This may enable a firm 
to engage in quality discrimination where quality differences are not reflected in 
the price of goods or services.’100 In practice, a gatekeeper could facilitate such a 
practice by restricting the products that are displayed to consumers or changing 
the order in which they are listed to display poorer quality products first in some 
circumstances.101 Amazon’s infamous ‘dynamic pricing’ experiment provides an 
illustration of how profiling might be used to offer products to individuals at 
differentiated prices based on their assumed reserve price.102 While this 
differentiation falls short of discrimination, it takes advantage of the information 
asymmetry between the individual and the profiler, to the disadvantage of the 
individual. The profiler will attempt to gauge the reserve price of the individual – 
the maximum cost he or she is willing to pay, or the lowest quality he or she is 
willing to accept – and make an offer on this basis. An individual may therefore 
pay more than he or she needed for goods or services, allowing the company to 
extract more profit from their offerings and thus entailing a ‘transfer of wealth 
from the pockets of consumers to the pockets of operators’. 103  
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In addition, studies conducted by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) on 
online targeted advertising and pricing, indicate that certain misleading pricing 
techniques could ‘result in consumers making purchasing decisions they would not 
have made were prices more clearly advertised, or spending more than they 
needed to’. 104 Such profiling can therefore prey on user vulnerability. This may be 
even more evident in the case of those classified as ‘financially challenged’105 who 
may be targeted with payday loans, or those classified as ‘risk takers’ who might be 
offered gambling opportunities etc. 106  
An overarching concern is the opacity of these personalisation practices. 
Writing in the media plurality context, Hellberger et al conclude that while 
gatekeepers do not necessarily have a negative impact on media plurality given the 
ranger of news outlets available online, it should  
 
be considered problematic that users have no knowledge of the selection 
criteria on which the processes of implicit personalisation are based and that 
they are not provided with any tools to change them or “turn them off”. 
Thus, they are unable to assess how limited their news selection is.107  
 
Pasquale also highlights this opacity stating that there may be ‘scarlet letters 
emblazoned on our digital dossiers’ that we may not even know about.108 These 
problems may be exacerbated when the profile is incorrect, and does not reflect 
the individual’s actual spending power, personal interests or characteristics.109 
However, this lack of knowledge is not the sole problem. Indeed, some 
gatekeepers give individuals the option to view and to amend the parameters that 
are used to generate their profiles, thereby co-opting the individual into the 
process.110 Yet, even if an individual can view and amend the factors influencing a 
particular profile, he or she might not be able to challenge the inferences drawn 
from the profile, including the inference of disinclination or imperviousness to 
change. If an individual is categorised in a manner that he or she disagrees with, 
for instance, ‘diabetic lifestyle’ or ‘leans left’111, a profiler may be able to argue that 
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the inference is simply a matter of opinion rather than fact.112 Moreover, even if 
an individual knows that certain characteristics are valued, or punished, more than 
others when determining the terms and conditions on which goods and services 
are offered, this may not help them decipher how to act. A trivial example 
illustrates this point. Some grocery retailers that offer motor insurance use 
purchasing data from loyalty schemes to ‘draw inferences about household 
characteristics – for instance, to offer discounts to households that appeared from 
their shopping habits to be relatively low risk’.113 However, in the endless debates 
over whether an occasional glass of red wine is good for you, or whether butter is 
better than margarine, even if an individual were to try conform to a profiler ‘ideal’ 
this may not be possible.  
The risk of discrimination is an additional concern. Most evidently, as FTC 
Commissioner Edith Ramirez highlights, algorithmic data profiling can 
‘accidentally classify people based on categories that society has decided – by law 
or ethics – not to use, such as race, ethnic background, gender or sexual 
orientation.’114 In its report on data brokers, the FTC notes that individuals are 
divided into segments such as ‘Urban Scramble’ and ‘Mobile Mixers’, which 
ostensibly focus on minority communities with lower incomes but which 
incorporate a high concentration of Latino and African-American consumers. 115 It 
notes that these segments may be more sensitive as a result of their reliance on 
characteristics, such as ethnicity, income level and education.116 While not all 
profiling based on protected characteristics is illegitimate (for instance, some 
profiling may facilitate affirmative action policies), such discriminatory profiling 
may serve to perpetuate existing inequalities. For example, certain groups, which 
have been judged un-creditworthy in the past, and therefore offered 
disadvantageous terms of credit that they have struggled to meet, will have their 
difficulties charted and held against them in data-driven lending cycles. As 
Pasquale notes, ‘late payments will be more likely, and then will be fed into present 
credit scoring models as neutral, objective, non-racial indicia of reliability and 
creditworthiness’.117 In this way, the profiling actually increases the likelihood of a 
consumer defaulting.118 Perhaps of most concern is the potential for gatekeepers, 
most notably search ranking mechanisms, to go beyond registering perceptions 
and to create them. Research indicates that a Google search for Caucasian names 
present more neutral results than for typically African-American names. 
Transparency is once again critical here: without access to the underlying coding 
and data, it is nearly impossible to adjudicate the dispute’ as to whether this is 
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simply a result of Google’s search optimisation.119  In sum therefore, gatekeepers 
are in a position to use profiles to differentiate and discriminate between 
individuals. While such differentiation and discrimination is not the sole purview 
of the gatekeeper, its effects may be exacerbated in this context given the 
privileged structural position enjoyed by gatekeepers and the opacity of gatekeeper 
operations.  
 
ii. Structural impediments to individual control over personal data  
The increase in personal data processing driven by the digitisation of data has left 
individuals feeling a loss of control over personal data.120 Although we are 
currently encouraged ‘to give up on privacy in terms of collection of data (…) and 
to focus instead on developing principles and guidelines regarding usage’121, some 
individuals are taking matters into their own hands by and availing themselves of 
technologies, such as ad-blockers, identity masking services and ‘data dirtying’, to 
prevent or disrupt data processing practices.122 Such practices may simply end in 
an obfuscation arms-race, in which only the most savvy individuals will stay ahead.  
Normatively speaking, however, some level of control over personal information 
is desirable so that we can challenge or prevent data processing we deem 
objectionable, and ascertain how and why our data are being used when we so 
desire. Yet, even if we were to focus solely on the use of personal data rather than 
its initial collection, meaningful individual control over personal data use remains 
beyond the grasp of most individuals. Information on why and how data are 
processed is tucked away in lengthy boilerplate terms and conditions and couched 
in vague terms.123 For instance, one online retailer states in its privacy policy that it 
might share customers’ profiles and e-mail addresses with ‘retail partners, service 
providers, subcontractors and manufacturers’.124 Such sweeping statements are 
commonplace, and even regulators have difficulty in coming to terms with these 
practices without committing significant resources to their investigation.125 
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Moreover, even when individuals are offered more granular ‘surface’ control over 
their personal information, this may only serve to mask how their data are 
processed ‘behind the scenes’.126 In this context, it is therefore a perpetual 
challenge to obtain freely-given, specific and informed consent, as required by data 
protection law: the risks of data processing are unclear, individuals engage in 
myopic decision making (perhaps as a result) and challenges to how or why 
personal data are used are often not worth the candle. Moreover, attempts to do 
so may often further disadvantage the individual.127 As Solove suggests, in reality: 
 
(1) people do not read privacy policies;  
(2) if people read them, they do not understand them;  
(3) if people read and understand them, they often lack enough background 
knowledge to make an informed choice; and  
(4) if people read them, understand them, and can make an informed choice, 
their choice might be skewed by various decisionmaking difficulties.128 
 
iii. An alternative narrative 
Viewing these concerns – stemming from profiling and loss of control over 
personal data – through a solely economic lens offers a different perspective. 
While it is acknowledged that fundamental rights can have economic rationales 
and ramifications (the right to property being an evident example), their 
interpretation and application is not driven solely by an economic logic. Rights-
based and economics-based perspectives may therefore overlap yet remain 
distinct.129 Let us first consider the example of profiling: profiles, like knives, may 
be dual (or multi) use. As a result, it could be argued that it is only in the event of 
systematic misuse or abuse of profiles that regulation would be appropriate. Some 
data brokers in the US have, for instance, categorised individuals according to an 
‘assimilation code’, which indicates a consumer’s ‘degree of assimilation to the 
English language.’ 130 This categorisation may have beneficial uses: it could be used 
to offer language-learning opportunities to those most in need, or perhaps to 
simplify the language used to present data use terms and conditions to these 
individuals. However, it could also be used to the disadvantage of individuals: 
governments could use it to identify ‘unassimilated’ immigrants, or corporate 
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actors could use it to bamboozle those in the category with terms and conditions 
presented in difficult language.  
Furthermore, personalisation ensures that companies reach their target 
audience – those who are most likely to purchase their products or avail of their 
services. From a business perspective, it makes sense to sell beauty products to a 
woman at the time of data when her profile suggests she feels less attractive131: this 
may lead to a higher conversion rate from the advertisement presented to 
purchases. Differentiation in the form of price discrimination may also be deemed 
efficient: if a company can correctly ascertain an individual’s reserve price, it can 
ensure that each customer is offered its products or services at the maximum price 
they can afford to pay. Individuals who can afford to pay more would therefore 
subsidise individuals who can afford to pay less and more individuals would gain 
access to the product or service overall.132  
Given this dual-use potential of profiles, it has been suggested that a more 
targeted approach to data profiling practices is preferable: only undesirable 
profiling practices should be prohibited. This assumes that the fact of collecting 
personal data and using it to categorise individuals is not itself a problematic 
practice. This assumption is difficult to reconcile with the established 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right to 
private life. The ECtHR has held that the ‘mere’ fact of systematically collecting 
and storing the publicly available personal data of an individual can constitute an 
interference with the individual’s right to private life. It is irrelevant whether this 
systematic collection and storage of data inconveniences the applicant.133 
Moreover, individuals do not waive their rights by engaging in public activities that 
are subsequently documented.134  
Such systematic collection and storage of personal data may, like the 
aggregation of communications traffic data, permit very ‘precise conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the private life of individuals’135 and, as such, it ‘is likely to 
generate in minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are 
the subject of constant surveillance’.136 The use, or misuse, of the personal data in 
a way that causes prejudice to the individual is therefore not a prerequisite for a 
finding that the systematic collection and storage of personal data interferes with 
the right to private life. This prima facie interference with the right to private life is 
not recognised when data profiling is viewed from a purely economic perspective. 
It is of course true that a practice that constitutes a prima facie interference with 
the right to private life pursuant to Article 8(1) ECHR can still be justified – and 
thus lawful – if the conditions set out in Article 8(2) ECHR are fulfilled. These 
conditions essentially permit a violation of the right to private life if this violation 
                                                      
131 Pasquale, The Black Box Society (n 39) 30.  
132 Hal Varian, ‘Price discrimination’ in Schmalensee, Richard and Robert Willig (eds), Handbook of 
industrial organisation (Elsevier 1989), 600.  
133 Amann v Switzerland (2000) 30 EHRR 843.  
134 Rotaru v Romania (App No 28341/95) (unreported) 4 May 2000.  
135 Digital Rights Ireland (n 91) [27].  
136 Ibid. [37].  
                           1/2017 
 
 26 
is proportionate, in accordance with the law and necessary to ensure a competing 
public interest.137 However, in the context of gatekeepers the personalisation and 
differentiation that data profiling facilitates are presumed to be economically 
efficient and thus desirable irrespective of the impact on privacy.  
Finally, as a result of the transactional approach to personal data protection 
taken in most jurisdictions, it is assumed that if ‘consumers choose to use services 
from companies that offer little to no privacy protection, that reveals a preference 
to spend little to nothing on (or looking for) privacy’.138 For instance, Zarsky has 
suggested that as Facebook and Google grew under a ‘lenient privacy regime’, 
their ‘emergence might indicate a shift in public preferences regarding privacy, and 
the market’s response to such change’.139  This, of course, ignores the fact that a 
‘lemons equilibrium’ may now prevail: the quality of the goods and services traded 
have been degraded as a result of information asymmetries between individuals 
and those who process their personal data leaving only (poor quality) ‘lemons’ 
behind.140  
It is once again therefore suggested that when a purely economic approach is 
adopted to the profiling and data processing activities of gatekeepers, the potential 
harms identified above fall in the blind spots and risk being over-looked or 
downplayed. This is not to say that further regulation is the only necessary or 
desirable solution to these potential harms. Regulators must elucidate why digital 
gatekeepers are distinct from other sites of concentrated power. The problematic 
practices that profiling may facilitate, and the loss of control individuals over 
personal data felt (and experienced) by individuals are not exclusive to the online 
environment. On the contrary, current business practices indicate that the line 
between ‘offline’ and ‘online’ practices is difficult to draw when it comes to the 
creation of profiles. Practices such as ‘onboarding’, whereby a data broker adds 
offline data into a cookie to enable advertisers to use consumers’ offline activities 
to determine what online advertisements to deliver to them, indicate that there 
may be little value in taking a distinct approach to the regulation of digital 
gatekeepers.141 Equally, regulators must consider why the use of profiles by 
gatekeepers is distinct. For instance, is offering an individual a beauty product at a 
certain time in the day based on his or her profile different to the practice of 
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selling chocolate bars and snacks at supermarket checkouts? Both, it could be 
argued, are psychological ploys to encourage sales.  
Competition experts have suggested that there is ‘no need to discard the 
competition playbook simply because platforms in the digital economy operate 
‘online’’. 142 However, it would appear that the key attribute of gatekeepers is not 
‘being digital’; it is their power. Nevertheless, key questions remain to be answered 
regarding this power: is it the nature or degree of the power that is problematic, or 
is the way it is related to other configurations and forms of power? Once we have 
a better understanding of this power of gatekeepers, we must then consider 
whether this increasing power143 is sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant their 
regulation.144 We will need to consider whether social regulation should impose a 
special responsibility on firms with gatekeeper power analogous to the ‘special 
responsibility’145 imposed on firms with market power by competition law. The 
structuring role of gatekeepers – directing individuals towards content and services 
on over one trillion webpages146 – might itself be adequate to justify this special 
burden.     
 
 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper advances two claims. The first is that a shift in focus is required from 
the paradigm of platform power to that of a gatekeeper. This shift will help to 
uncover the broader human rights and public policy issues at stake in the debate. 
The ‘platform power’ terminology is both too broad (platform) and too narrow 
(power, understood as market power). Moreover, by focus on regulating a 
technology rather than a problematic conduct or processes, regulation risks 
tackling the wrong regulatory target and being rendered redundant by 
technological change. The House of Lords echoes this finding in its report, which 
suggests that the Commission’s consultation is ‘too broadly designed to address 
the issues raised decisively.’147 
Identifying the correct regulatory target is however a tricky task and the 
concerns voiced regarding the activities of digital gatekeepers are diffuse and 
difficult to group in a coherent, compelling narrative. As a result, mapping a 
regulatory response can be challenging. In tackling this challenge, it will be helpful 
for regulators to bear in mind the second claim set out in this paper: that by 
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viewing the functioning of internet gatekeepers through a purely economic lens, 
concerns pertaining to individual rights will be caught in the blind spot.  
This second claim could have several practical ramifications. The House of 
Lords recommends that the European Commission should appoint a panel of 
independent experts to identify priority areas for action in the digital economy and 
to make specific recommendations. It is suggested that any such panel must 
include expertise from a diverse range of backgrounds, and in particular include 
individuals with expertise in human rights as well as economic regulation. 
Competition experts acknowledge that disruptive innovation in consumer markets 
unsettles social norms and raises questions that ‘can be couched in competition 
terms but actually are much, much bigger.’148 We are therefore faced with the task 
of identifying these bigger questions, and determining whether they should be 
answered by ex ante regulation. In so doing, it is necessary to recognise that the 
analysis of political, social and cultural dimensions of gatekeepers must accompany 
an economic analysis of their role.149  
Ultimately, the threshold for regulatory intervention will be a high one. This is 
for two reasons. First, the preferred framework for regulatory intervention in the 
EU is cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Pursuant to this framework, regulators are 
encouraged to ensure that ex ante regulatory tools are targeted to specific harms to 
avoid disproportionate effects. However, as Cohen highlights, it is difficult to 
model and quantify the probability of future harm: the threat of future harm 
involves risk and also uncertainty, and uncertainty is by definition hard to quantify. 
150 Moreover, some of the potential concerns gatekeepers may entail are invisible 
when a purely economic perspective is adopted or, at best, hard to put in numbers 
when compared to the tangible benefits offered by gatekeepers. 151 It is therefore 
necessary to acknowledge the distributional impact of this technique of regulation. 
Proponents of CBA deem it to be a ‘neutral, rational discourse for evaluating 
regulatory benefits and burdens’ while those who oppose CBA argue that it 
‘persistently undervalues threatened harms that are diffuse, cumulative and 
difficult to describe in monetized, present-value terms, and that it therefore 
predictably works to the advantage of vested economic interests’.152 The 
shortcomings of using CBA to assess the need for regulatory intervention in this 
field cannot therefore be overcome by adding non-monetary costs and benefits to 
the scales, alongside monetary costs and benefits as suggested by the Dutch report 
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on platforms. 153  This problem might be further aggravated by the fact that 
‘economists’ results provide little certainty about whether policy intervention is 
called for in any given case, there can be a strong inclination to do nothing until 
the evidence of harm is incontrovertibly clear’.154 This cautious perspective will 
favour a deregulatory approach. 
Secondly, regulators deciding to act in this field will need to tackle with the so-
called Collingridge dilemma, or pacing problem. If regulators intervene at an early 
stage in a technology’s development, regulation might be pre-emptive and would 
not be based on adequate information about the technology’s likely impact. 
Regulation would therefore risk harming innovation by ‘locking in existing 
standards’ and allowing ‘today’s plucky innovators [to become] tomorrow’s sleepy 
incumbents’. 155 However, if regulation is delayed to a later stage of the 
technology’s development and deployment, the technology may be too entrenched 
to regulate effectively.156 Coates refers to this as the ‘Goldilocks’ problem, adding 
a third hurdle based on Schumpter’s ‘creative destruction’157: ‘even when the 
porridge is just right, you still should not eat the porridge because something even 
better than porridge will come along soon’.158 The issue of when to intervene can 
lead to regulatory paralysis.  
Ultimately however, even in the absence of regulation, this debate will provide 
regulators with the opportunity to grapple with some of the bigger issues in an era 
of informational capitalism, and to ‘rethink major assumptions about the causes 
and effects of power in information markets’.159 This rethinking is overdue, given 
the ostensible mismatch between the economic concerns tackled by antitrust law 
and the non-economic concerns identified in section three. The market simply 
may not suffice to deliver public values that regulators wish to maintain in a digital 
era. 160 Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that public values and market 
economics may be closely connected in this context. If individuals lose trust in 
gatekeepers, as a result of the search results or prices they are offered, this will 
have a negative effect on the business model of gatekeepers. For instance, 
increased usage of tools such as adblockers ‘threaten the revenue streams that 
many digital content providers rely upon’.161 It is therefore little wonder that some 
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gatekeepers are now openly recognising that ‘there is greater economic, social and 
individual benefit in restoring trust to the market, rather than responding to or 
exploiting its lack’.162 If gatekeepers themselves do not act to gain and maintain 
this trust, the case for regulation may become easier to make.  
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